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THE ALIBI.
It needs no proof that A cannot personally commit a crime, unless he is at the place of the commission of the crime, at the time of
its commission. It cannot matter what the crime is, whether mulder, 1-or larceny.2 or burglary- or any other. At a trial for %
crime, the burden is on the consmonwealth, to prove that the crime
was committed, and that it was committed by the defendant. Hence.
the bur,'en is on it, to prove that he was at the place where, at the
time when, it was committed. Not until it furnishes evidence
which, unrefuted by that of the defendant, would put the jury beyond reasonable doubt of this presence of the defendant at the place
of the crime, can it procure a conviction. If the Commonwealth
fails to educe this amount of evidence of that fact, the jury must acquit, without any evidence from the defendant.
What kind of evidence may the defendant use, in order to
avert the persuasion that would follow from that of the prosecution? He must either concede his presence at the place where and
the time when the alleged crime was perpetrated, or he must deny
his presence there, then. Conceding his presence, he must deny his
agency, i. e.. furnish evidence that another, and not he, did the deed,
or he must impart a non-criminal east to the deed, by proof that it
'Briceland v. Comm., 74 Pa., 463; Turner v. Comm., 86 Pa., 54; Fife v.
Comm., 29 Pa., 429.
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 15
'Commonwealth v. Seybert, 4 Kulp, 4;
Phila., 386.
3 Commonwealth v. McMahon, 145 Pa., 413; Watson v. Commonwealth,
95 Pa., 418; Commonwealth v. Gutshall, 22 Super., 269.
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was accidental; or that it was committed in self-defence, or that he
was insane, etc. He may also furnish evidence that he was elsewhere, and therefore, that he did not' commit the deed. The proof
that he was elsewhere, (alibi.) is simply an indirect proof that he
did not do the'deed.
Unless we are to say that, when the prosecution has, its evidence
being unrebutted, produced conviction of guilt, all evidence by the
defendant tending to prove his innocence, is suspicious, it is difficult to account for the prejudice against evidence of an alibi, which
is simply one of several forms of refutation of the commonwealth's
testimony. The state's witness has said that X, the defendant, shot
or stabbed Y, the deceased. If a witness called by X to prove that
le was present when the shooting or stabbing occurred, and that X
did not do it, is not to be for that reason suspected, why should he be
suspected if he testifies that, though he was present, he did not see
X, aiid therefore that X was not there?, or, if he testifies that he was
at a remote point when the shooting or stabbing occurred, and that"
X was present at that remote point, and therefore was not at the
place where the crime was done; and therefore, did not do it?
It is not unusual, however, for courts to warn juries against
the effort of a defendant to prove that he was elsewhere when the
crime was committed; as .if this were different in motive and object
from the effort by other means, to disprove the criminal agency of
the defendant.
An instance of the tendency to depreciate the so-called alibi is
found in Fife v 'Commonwealth,' where the trial judge stated to the
Jury, "The best writers on criminal evidence say that alibi evidence
lies under a great and general prejudice, and ought to be heard
with uncommon caution." In .a 1ater case,2 Gordon, P. J., deemed
it his duty to point the jurors' attention "to the fact established in
capital cases, that the temptation is very great to resort to it as a
shield or protection from the consequences of crime." Schull, P. J. 3
undertakes to explain the ground of suspicion, by remarking that,
frequently resorted to by defendants,4 it is "usually made out by
members of the family of the accused." When a grave crime is
imputed, evidence for the Commonealth ought probably tobeheard
with "uncommon caution."
A man's life or liberty should
not be sacrificed by a. jury exercising any caution short of this. As
to the credibility of witnesses, the mere fact that they testify for
the defendant ought not to ,nake it more suspicious, than if
'29

Pa., 429.

' Comm. v. Mika, 171 Pa., 273.
' Comm. v. Gutshall, 22 Superior, 469.
'The case was one of burglary.
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The defendant's own testimony in
they testified against him
self-exoneration must always be open to suspicion because of
his visible motive to suppress or distort the facts, and to a nearly equal degree must that of his wife, his children, his parents,
his near friends. But it is hard to see how evidence from
these witnesses tending to prove an alibi, is any more untrustworthy than evidence from them, intended, by any other way,
to prove the innocence of the accused; evidence, e. g., that he was,
not where the crime was committed, when it was committed; or that
not he, but some one else, did the deed; or that he was too drunk to
be capable of forming an intent to kill, or that he was acting in
self-defence; or that the deed was an accident.
One thing the alibi does do. It enables a class of witnesses to
testify for the accused, that otherwise could not be heard. If only
those who were able or willing to say that they were at the place
where the crime was committed, and at the time, could testify for
him, the number would be small, and often his nearest relatives
and friends would not be among them. Though not there, they can
practically testify to the same thing, by testifying that being elsewhere when the crime was done, the defendant was with them. Bur
the suspiciousness of the evidence of alibi, probably, rests rather on
the suspiciousness of the witnesses who prove it, than on its own
intrinsic incredibleness. Disinterested witnesses who prove the absence of the defendant from 'the locus of the crime, ought surely to
be believed as readily as those -who testify to his presence, and testifying to presence elsewhere, i. e., indirectly testifying to absence, is
surely no more suspicious than direct testimony to absence.
A strange opinion has found expression by some courts, that the
offer of proof of an alibi is dangerous to the accused. It was said,
e. q., in Fife v. Commonwealth.' that by tendering evidence that he
was at some other, place, when the crime was committed, the prisoner
"admits that all the prosecution alleges is true." What this means,
it is possible only to surmise. The commonwealth alleges two
things, viz: 1. That A. the deceased, was shot at a.certain time and
place. in a certain mode., under certain conditions, and, 2, That he
was thus shot by X, the prisoner. It is manifestly absurd to say that
by proving an alibi X "admits that all the prosecution alleges. is
true." When X says he was at place 5,he is surely not admitting
that he at the same time, killed A at place m. Lewis, C. J., vindicates the remarks of the trial judge, by interpreting them thus:
"He was speaking of the defence of alibi alone, and is to be understood as saying that, for the purpose of that particular defence, the
29 Pa., 429.
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burden of the proof was thrown upon the prisoner, and the allegations of the prosecution are admitted to be true." This is precisely
what is incomprehensible. The prosecution says the defendant X,
at place m killed A, and we aare asked to think that X admits this
when he says that he was not at place m at that time, but at place 1!
Possibly, what is meant is, that the defendant by proof of alibi
admits the first of the allegations supra, of the commonwealth, viz:
That A was shot at ra, at a certain time; but not the second, viz.,
that he, X, did the shooting. But is this true? Can a man not
know that he was at I at a certain time, without knowing that a
shooting was occurring at place 7n, possibly 500 miles distant? How
then, if, accused of this shooting, he proves that he was at 1, does he
either affirm or deny, that the shooting actually occurred at , by
somebody? It is palpably absurd to say that in proving what he
knows to be true, he admits what he may know nothing at all
about. It is clear to the dullest apprehension that he makes no such
admission, 1 and any court that would invent the fiction that he
does, would perpetrate both a stupidity and a crime.
Another kind of peril for the prisoner has been said by some
courts, to attend the employment of the alibi. If despite the pris.
oner's evidence the jury is convinced that he was not at the place at
which he avers that he was, it becomes evident to them that he has
attempted to manufacture evidence, "a circumstance which always
bears against him." "No innocent person," said Orvis, J., "is driven
to manufacture evidence.' 2 The Supreme Court concedes that if
the defendant was detected in an attempt to corrupt witnesses or to
manufacture evidence,, "it would certainly weigh heavily against
him." It distinguishes, however, between what is evidence of these
acts, and mere failure to prove the alibi. As the prisoner presumably knew whether he was at place Z or place rn, on the occasion of
the. murder or other crime, it is difficult to see how the jury can ever
convict him, that is, have no reasonable doubt that he was at m.
without believing him to have either induced witnesses to swear to
what he knew to be untrue, or at least to have availed himself of
evidence known by him to be untrue. Perhaps the error of Orvis. J..
was in not distinguishing between the jury's not belie?'ing that the
prisoner 'was at place 5. and their believing that he was not at place 1.
If they were in doubt, they couhJ not logically say, the prisoner has
fabricated evidence that he was at 1; therefore, he probably was at
m. but if they were convinced that he was not at 1, they could reason: theprisoner has attempted, with knowledge of the falsity of the
IBriceland v. Comm., 74 Pa., 463.
2Turner v. Comm., 86 Pa., 54.
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averment, to convince us that he.was at 1; he probably would not
have done this, had he been innocent of the crime; therefore he i-3
probably guilty. The prisoner may attempt to convince the jury
that he was at place 1. His mere failure to convince that he was, is
not the same thing as their being convinced that he was not. If
they are convinced that lie was not at 1, they surely have reason to
suspect his guilt, if it be true that the attempt to corrupt witnesses,
to manufacture evidence, or to use evidence known to be manufactured and false, 'would certainly weigh heavily against him."'
A notion that has obtained expression in several cases, is that
the 'burden" is on the defendant to prove that he was not at the
place of the crime, when it was committed. "You see then," said
the trial judge in Fife v. Commonwealth,2 "that when a person accused of crime, sets up the defence of alibi, it lies upon him to prove,
to the clear satisfaction of the jury, where lie was." In a later murder case3 Livingston, P. J., charged the jury that "where a prisoner
sets up an alibi as a defence, the burden of proving his alibi to the
satisfaction of the jury is thrown upon him. If he does not do this,
his defence of alibi fails entirely." In neither of these cases is the
doctrine distinctly repudiated by the Supreme Court. That court.,
in both cases, reiterates that the burden of proving the alibi is on the
defendant. But the statement is virtually retracted in both cases,
by the addition that even if the defendant has not convinced the
jury that he was at the place at which he seeks to prove that he was,
he may leave the jury in doubt whether he was there or not. If
the jury has a reasonable doubt whether he was at I when the crime
was committed at in, it has a reasonable doubt whether he was at
m; and if it doubts whether he was at im, it of course doubts whether he did the shooting at n. This seems so entirely clear that one
is perplexed when one seeks to understand what the courts could
have meant, by the statement that the burden is on the defendant
to prove that he was elsewhere, "to the satisfaction of the jury."
The prosecution says, X, the prisoner, was at m, he says he was not;
the former that he had a pistol.-he says he had not; the former
that he threatened to kill,-he says he did not; the former that he
fired the pistol,-he says he did not. In all these cases, X denies
some allegation of the commonwealth and furnishes evidence in support of his denial. lie offers evidence that he did iot shoot. Must
'In Comm. v. MeMahon, 145 Pa., 413, the jury were told, without error
that if the defence of alibi was false and manufactured, it should "have
some weight against the defendant."
229

Pa., 429.

'Rudy v. Comm., 128 Pa., 500.
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he prove he did not, to the satisfaction of the jury? That he did
not threaten to kill. Must he prove that he did not? That he did
not have a pistol. Must he prove that he did not? That he was not
at m. Must he prove that he was not? Surely it is clear that he
does not need to prove any of these things. It is enough if his evidence reduces the belief of the jury, created by the commonwealth's
testimony, to a doubt. Doubting whether he had a pistol, or whether he shot, or whether he was present at m, the jury must acquit; and
it matters not whether this doubt is the result of the evidence of the
prosecution, which has failed to produce belief, or whether it is the
result of that of the defendant, which has destroyed the nascent belief engendered by the evidence of the commonwealth.
If the defendant had offered witnesses to prove that they were
at m when the crime was committed, and that Xwas not there would
any court say that, having attempted to prove that he was not there,
he must "satisfy" the jury that he was not? Why impute to him
the attempt to prove that he was not there? He has attempted, not
to prove that he was no there, but to refute the evidence of the Commonwealth that he was there; that is, to prevent the commonwealth's convincing the jury that he was there. This is a legitimate
attempt, and if he accomplishes it; if he causes the jury to doubt despite the prosecution's evidence, he achieves his acquittal.
Now, how can it matter in what way X goes about producing
this doubt? Whether he furnishes witnesses who were at m and
say that he was vot there, or furnishes witnesses who were at 7, and
say that at a particular time, (that of the commission of the crime)
he was at I? If he was at 1, he was not at qn.. If the testimony
leaves the jury in doubt as to his being at 7. it leaves them in doubt
as to his being at m.
Occasionally the court speaks of the alilbi as a -"substantive" defence.1 What does this mean? When the commonwealth proves
that X killed A, not expressly proving that he was sane, or sober, or
not acting in self-defence, or not an officer justified by the facts, iii
doing the act, X may disclose by evidence his insanity, his drunkenness, the assault that required him to inflict the wound in self-defence, the official position which warranted the act. These may, if
one chooses, be callr d "substantive" defences, i. e., by way of confession and avoidance. They do not contradict the testimony of the
commonwealth. They bring into view new phenomena, which
change the cast of the acts proven to have been done. But the defence of alibi is not such. It is a denial of the very facts proved by
the commonwealth. The prose.iution says, X was at m, and there
'Rudy

v. Comm., 128 Pa., 5.00.
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shot A. X says, I was not at m, and, therefore, did not shoot A.
He proves that he was not at m, by proving that he was at 1. Indeed, all proof of that absence would have to be indirect. There
are only two conceivable modes. Some one who was at m, must
prove that X was 'not there, or -ome one who at the same time was
at 1 must prove that X was there. But how does the witness know
that X was notat m? Did he see him, hear him, feel him? No
He simply did not see him, or hear him, or feel him. He infers
from the non-existence of the memory of the sight, hearing, feeling;
that of the sight, hearing, feeling; and he infers from the non-existence of the sight, hearing, feeling, the non-presence of the object
which, if present, would surely have been seen, heard, felt. When
the evidence is that X was at 1, it is that he was seenheard, etc.,
there.
Some of the cases concede that an alibi "is a traverse of the
crime charged,"' and properly hold that the evidence in support of
it may, though not convincing the jury, leave it in a reasonable
doubt, anld thus require an acquittal. What is needed is to extirpate all assertions that it is a "substantive" defence, and, as such,
needs to be proved to the satisfaction of the jury. It is a traverse
of the commonwealth's assertion that X was at place m, and there
committed a crime, and like the denial of any other fact essential to
guilt, e. g., that X had the weapon, or used it, it is enough if the
evidence produces doubt concerning its truth.
Sometimes strong assertions are made, as to the clearness of the
impossibility that X should h%ve been at the place where his witnesses prove him to have been, and that before or later, he should have.
been at the place where the crime was done, when it was done.
When the precise time of the murder at m is not known, there may
be a possibility that X was at I when he is proven to have been seen
there, and also that he was at m.when the murder was committed
there. In Briceland v. Commonwealth, 2 Agnew, J.. said, "When a
defence, rests on proof of an alibi, it must cover the time when the
offence is shown to have been committed, so as to preclude the possibility of the prisoner's presence at the place of the murder. * * *
If it be possible that he could have been at both places, the proof of
the alibi is valueless." The opinion by W. D. Porter, J., in Commonwealth v. Gutshall, 3substantially adopts this language. It has
'Rudy v. Comm.,.128 Pa., 500; Comm. v. Gutshall, 22 Superior, 269;
Comm. v. Salyards, 153 Pa., 501; Turner v. Comm., 86 Pa., 54; Watson v.
Comm., 95 Pa., 418.
2 74 Pa., 463. An echo of this is found in the charge of the court In
Comm. v. McMahon, 145 Pa., 413.
8 22 Superior, 269.
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been already suggested that what the defendant needs to do, is not to
convince the jury that he was at 1, when the crime was being commit
ted at rn,, but to produce in them a doubt whether he was not atL
If it appears that the crime was committed at m at 3 o'clock p. m.,
and that X was at 1, 14 miles from m, at 2.30 o'clock, it would not
be impossible for him to have got from I to m in time,if asteamtrain
left I at 2.35 o'clock, whose speed was 50 miles an hour. Yet X's being in ,m in time, might be rendered doubtful. It is idle to say that
the impossibility of being in one of the two places at one time, and
in the other at the other time, must appear; otherwise the evidence
is useless. The task of the defendant is to produce a reasonable
doub of his being at m at 3 o'clock. If this is produced by the evidence as to his being at I at 2.30 o'clock, the defendant must be ac.
quitted, and the reasonable doubt can be produced without proof of
impossibility.
Lrhe evidence as to the time at which the crime was committed at
m, or as to when the accused was at-I, may be uncertain. The crime
may have occurred at any time between 2 and 5 p. in., and the defendant may have been at I at 3 1). m., but if I is not verfir from i
he may have got to m in time 1:) commit the crime before the lapse
of five o'clock. His having done so may be probable or improbable.
The improbability may be considered by the jury, and if it engenders a reasonable doubt, an qcquittal must ensue. In Briceland v.
Commonwealth,' the murder was committed about midnight and
two and one-fourth miles from the residence of Truax. The evidence was that Briceland went to bed at Truax's, shortly after nine
o'clock. At one o'clock his coat was seen in the room occupied by
him. and snoring was heard in that room by one in the next room.
At half-past five o'clock he was awakened, and he took breakfast at
six o'clock. If he did the killing, he did it between the time he went
to bed, and the time when he was beard to snore. Though the evidence was not conclusive that when the nider occurred. Briceland
was in bed. it was proper to allow the jury to consider it. as tLmding
to raise a doubt of his presence at the scene of the nmrder.
We reach one or two practical conclusions. ('1). Tie Court
should refrain from telling the jury that the defence of alibi is suspicious. It is no more 5siI)iciotis than the defence, "I did not do the
deed." (2) The witnesses who are relied on to p)rove it. may be suspicious: but so may tho;e who l)rove any defence, e. g., self-defence,
insanity. drunkenness, accident. The witnesses who prove the crime
for the commonwealth are not always above suspicion. (3) The
'74

Pa., 464.
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alibi is not a "substantive" defence, if that word has any meaning.
It is a denial of the agency of the defendant in the crime. To describe it, either in the charge to the jury or elsewhere, as "substantive,' is to "darken counsel by words without knowledge." (4) It is
not necessary to establish the alibi to the satisfaction of the jury.
It is enough to produce, by means of the evidence of it, a reasonable
doubt as to whether the defendant was elsewhere (alibi) when the
crime was committed. (5) It is not necessary that, conceding the
credibility of the testimony, it -hould have been impossible for the
defendant to be at the place where the crime was committed, at th(
time of its commission. It is enough that his getting from the place
where he is shown to have been to the place of the crime, in time to
there commit it, should be so far improbable as to leave the jury in
reasonable doubt.
WILLIAm

TRICKETT.

MOOT COURT
BARNETT vs. CORSON.

Libel-Truth of Statement as a Defence-Malice-Act of Apr. 11, 1901, Construed.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Barnett was convicted of larceny on circumstantial evidence. He was in
fact innocent, but was compelled to s erve a term in the penitentiary. Upon
his discharge- he went to Colorado and made friends. He became cashier of
a bank and was about to marry. Corson, animated by an old grudge, then
wrote to the prospective bride and to the president of Barnett's bank, reciting
his conviction and imprisonment. As a result he lost both his bride and hie
position. He brings this action against Corson for these losses.
Cohan for the plaintiff.
A libel marc be defined to be any malicious publication written, printea,
or painted, which by words or signs tends to expose a person to contempt.
ridicule, hatred, or degradation of character. Collins v. Dispatch Pub. Co.,
152 Pa. 187; Wood v. Boyle, 177 Pa. 620.
Cited sections 1 and 3 of Act of Apr. 11, 1901.
LaBar for the defendant.
The truth of any defamatory worcs, is, if pleaded, a complete defence
to any action of libel or slander. Odgers on Libel & Slander, p. 170; Press
Co. v. Stewart, 119 Pa. 584.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.
HICKS, J.-This Is an action of trespass for libel by Barnett against
Corson to recover damages for the all",ged loss of his wife and position as
Cashier in a Colorado Bank. By the Constitution of the State of Pennsylvania, in what is called the Bill of Righits, "Every citizen may freely speak,
write or print on any subject; being rcsponsible for the abuse of that liberty."
The abuse of that liberty Is what is called libel.
There is a statutory definition of libel in the Criminal Code of Pennsylvania, and It is to the following effect: "That if any person shall write, print,
or exhibit any malicious or defamatory libel, tending either to blacken the
memory of one who is dead, or the rerutation of one who Is living, thereby
exposing him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, such offence shall be
(teemed a misdemeanor." A libel may also be broadly defined to be "any
malicious publication written, printed or painted, which, by words or signs,
tends to expose a man to ridicule, contempt, hatred, or degradation of character'-McCorkle v. Binns, 5 Binn, 340; Pittock v. O'Niell, 63 Pa. 253.
It is true that Corson based his publication upon a conviction of the
plaintiff in a proper court on the charge of larceny. Hence, the defendant
had sufficient probable cause to warrant his believing that the plaintiff was
guilty of the felony, for the commission of which, he served imprisonment,
even though convicted on circumstantial evidence but actually innocent.
The question which presents itself, then, for o ur consideration, is, whether,
the whole truth or substantial truth of his publication is an exoneration for
the aforesaid publication.
The Act of 1901, P. L., page 74 and Sect. I, provides: "In all civil actions for libel the plea of justification shall be accepted as an adequate and
complete defence, when it is pleaded, and proved to the satisfaction of the
jury, under the direction of the court as in other cases, that the publication
is substantially true and is proper for public information or investigation and
has not been maliciously or negligently made." The publication by the defendant was true, for a competent court of competent jurisdiction had convicted the plaintiff of larceny, the subject of this publication. But, we note,
the above act in the latter part of the 2d section says: "and has not been
maliciously or negligently made." Of what vital import, then, is the admitted fact of the truth or substantial truth of the publication if
ii. was maliciously or negligently made. The act as the Court understands it
Is providing a defense for one who publishes any matter concerning another without malice or negligence, I. e., to say that If his publication is wholly
true or substantially true, the pleading of such, when found by the jury so,
to be, is an adequate and complete defence in all civil actions for libel.,
Iin the case at bar, Corson was animated in the publication of this Infor.
mation by an old grudge. The Standard Dictionary defines grudge to mean
"III will; Hatred;
Malice." We. then, have the defendant actuated by
malice publishing defamatory matter concerning the plaintiff. He, the de.
fendant,'cannot' avail himself of the truth of his charge as a defence, for under the Act of 1901, It is no defence if "maliciously or negligently made."
Under the Act of 1901, Sect. II, as quoted supra, we find embraced within Its provisions "that the publication is proper for public information or Investigation," another condition qualifying the defense of truth or substantial truth as a justification. There are certain classes of defamatory words:
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(1) those which naturally and necessarily import damage to another, those
which are said in technical language to be actionable in themselves;
(2)
and those which are only libellous when they do special damage. Under the
first class with which we are necessarily engaged in this case, we find two
other classes: (1) words that impute a crime to a person of whom they are
spoken; and (2), words whose natural tendency is to injure a man's office,
profession or business. This is verified in 11 Pa. 287, Struthers v. Peacock
et al. The statement of facts concedes the imputation of a crime to the
plaintiff by the defendant, so, we hasten to a further discussion of privileged
communications, publications proper for public Information.
In order that the part of the act, referred to, above, be satisfied, the communication must be made bona fide upon any subject matter in which the
party communicating has an interest or in reference to which he has a duty
although it contain criminatory matter which without this privilege would be
slanderous and actionable. Is that sufficient? No. It must be made to a
person having a corresponding interest -Bouvier's Law Dict. It is beyond
the comprehension of the court to conceive of any duty or interest in this
case which would impel the defendant to notify the employers of the plaintiff or his fiancee of his previous conviction or imprisonment. He was actuated by everything else but duty or interest, i.e., by malice, hatred or illwill. Can it be possible that an imprisonment of a man sometime ago places
humanity under a duty to shout it to every other individual? Neither the
bank directors nor his fiancee were interested in his past but in his present.
Even, had they been, he was an Innocent man suffering a penalty for a misdirection of justice.
A privileged communication is one- made upon a proper occasion, from
a proper motive and based upon reasonable or probable cause; 111 Pa., 404,
414; Briggs v. Garrett; and also, perhaps in a proper manner; for, if the manier be improper, the privilege is lost;--Justice Mitchell in Conroy v. Pitts,
Times, 139 Pa. 33;. A communication which would otherwise be privileged,
If made with malice In fact or through -etred, ill will and a malicious design to injure is not a privileged communication, but the burden of proof is
on the plaintiff to show actual malice or malice in fact. Defendant actuated
by an old grudge was guilty of aecual malice.
This communication was not privileged and the defendant being actuated
by malice, this makes him amenable to all damages.-In 5 Allen 169, Count
Joannes v. Bennett it was held that a letter to a woman, containing libellous
matte)r, concerning her suitor, cannot be justified on the ground that the
writer was her friend and former pastor, and that the letter was written at
request of the parents, who assented to all its conents. We also find in Krebq
v. Oliver, 12 Gray 239,that, statements that a man has been imprisoned for
larcery, made to the family of a woman whom he is about to marry, by one
who is nz relation of either, and not In answer to Inquiries, are not privilegeea
The damages to be paid by the defendant for his libellous publication
must be assessed by the jury under the Instructions of the court. Where
wordi are actionable as affecting the character of the plaintiff, he is always entitled to go to the jury on the question of general damages although
no actual damage has been shown. Leitz v. Hohman, 16 Superior Ct. 276;
Neeb v. Hope, 111 Pa. 145. Special damages are such as the law will not
presume to have followed from the words themselves but depend in part at
least on the special circumstances of the case. Hersh v. Ringwalt, 3 Yeates
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508; P. & L. Dig. of Dec., Col. 18629. Court charged that if the verdict was
for the plaintiff, the damages should be compensatory only, unless the jury
found that the words were spoken with malignant feelings and deliberate
purpose to expose the plaintiff to Ignominy and to injure his character, In
which case, exemplary or vindictive damage would be appropriate. Stroud v.
Smith 194 Pa. 502.
In view of the above decisions, the court charges the jury not only to
find compensatory damages, generally, for the plaintiff for loss of character,
and social position, but to find special damages for the loss of his wife.
The jury must also assess damages for loss of position. On authority of the
cse, Stroud v. Smith, supra, you can assess exemplary damages.
OPINION

OF SUPREME. COURT.

It is "horn-book law" that the truth of an assertion Is a complete defence
In a civil action for libel. So spoke Juctice Paxson in Press Company v.
Stewart, 119 Pa. 602. To cite authorities for so fundamental a principle
would be a work of supererogation. However, when A writes to B, "I believe B to be a witch," he will be liable in damages, though he truly represented his belief. So, too should he say, "C. believes B. to be a witch," he
would be liable though he could prove that C. had this belief. So if he
writes, "C. says that B. is a witch," pcof of C's declaration is no defence.
Whether stated as a fact or as the statement or belief of a third person such
an assertion tends to awaken similar beliefs or suspicions concerning B. In
the minds of others. The old English cases held that If the defendant, at
the time he repeated the words, gave the name of the author so that the
party injured might have his action against the latter, this was a justification. The result was that if an irresponsible scoundrel started a story one
could get no redress either from him or from the responsible person who
later quoted the words. The doctrine is now repudiated In the land of Its
origin. Ames Cas. Torts, p. 421, u 1. In Pennsylvania the rule has been
applied in cases of spoken defamation, If the report was such as to induce a
reasonable belief. Hersh v. Ringwalt, 3 Yeates 508. But it has not been extended to cases of libel. Oles v. Pittsburg Times, 2 Super. Ct. 130.
Now, when Corson stated that Barnett had been convicted of larceny,
he In effect stated that some jury in a certain court, together also with the
judge, had formally and solemnly declared this belief beyond a reasonable
doubt that he had committed a theft. Their belief was conclusive of the
fact as far as the punfshment of Barnett was concerned, but is it a relevant
matter In the trial of this issue for libel?
To charge that Barnett was convicted of larceny Is to make a double
charge; first, that Barnett was a convict; second, that he was a thief. The
first charge was true and Corson In aniy event can put the record of the conviction in evidence and so justify the first charge, but to prove the second
charge he must convince the jury before which he is a defendant that Bar.
nett did In fact commit the theft. Should the court have charged the jury
that they must accept the record f conviction as conclusive evidence of
guilt when the question arises 'collaterally in this Issue? We know that
Barnett was In fact innocent. If, through the discovery of new evidence, he
now cafi convince the jury that he was really innocent, may he not do so
"and thus repair his shattered reputation?
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It has been repeatedly decided that where A has been indicted for a
crime and acquitted, he may not give the record of the acquittal as evidence
of falsity of a charge when he is confronted by a plea of trtith in an action
for defamation brought by him against one who revived the charge on
which he had been tried. The reason given is that the parties in the two
suits are not the same. The defendant in the libel suit can say with force, "I
was not interested in the criminal proceeding and did not try to show A's
guilt.' Further, the acquittal Is merely a finding that the guilt was not
proven and not necessarily conclusive of A's innocence. The defendant in
the libel suit may have secured conclusive evidence of A's guilt, only discovered after the acquittal. This evidence he may produce and so escape
liability for the alleged libel. England v. Bourke, 3 Esp. 80; Corbley v. Wilson, 71 Ill. 209; McBee v. Tulton, 47 Md. 403.
Mr. Odgers applies the same rule when the defendant In the libel suit
offers the record of a conviction as evidence of the truth of the charge made
Odgers on Libel and Slander *547. But we have found no American cases on
the point and therefore will consider the question as an open one. How
should it be decided on principle? At first glance the cases seem analogous.
In both there has been a change of parties In the second suit. The Commonwealth is no longer a party. A stranger is trying to take advantage
of the judgment obtained by the State. It is submitted, however,
that there Is this important difference. When the defendant in this libel suit
offers the record of conviction as evidence of truth there is no room for
the plaintiff to reply, "I was not there to prove the falsity of the charge."
Be was there and he failed to discredit the proof of itstruth. He can only
say, "You were not a party to that proceeding." To which it may be replied,
"What of it? I would have only hastened your conviction."
Again, suppose an action for malicious prosecution, which is only an aggravated form of defamation, should have been begun against the man who
made the charge on which was founded the prosecution for larceny. It is
.orn-book law that the evidence of the convictionwould be conclusive evidence of the truth of the charge and that the truth in such cases is a complete
aefence. even should the proof be ever so clear that when he made the charge
he had no ground for suspecting Barnctt of the crime and was animated by
pure malice. Bigelow on Torts, Sees. 183 nnd 199. It may have been the
merast luck for this man that he escaped. If then, a man is to be justified
because a conviction followed the charge, how can we hold liable the man
who makes the same charge after a conviction and in reliance on it? , Surely
he should not be In a worse position because the conviction has become an
cestablished fact. True the one man was the instrument of bringing the criminal to justice, the other only increased his shame. But suiely the law does
not mean to encourage men to prosecute from malice and without probable
cause. It seems to intend that the forfeiture of this right of action should
be part of the punishment for the c-ime, juzt as one who steals must submit
to being called a thief. Reasoning by analogy we think that a conviction
should be as conclusive of truth in this libel suit before us, as in the supposed
suit for malicious prosecution.
In Magauran v. Patterson, 6 Ser. & R. 278, a case Is reported that arose
In Cumberland County. B. sued A. for slander, A. having called B. a liar.
A. plead the truth of his statement and on the theory that a slanderer Is
a liar he offercd evidence of a judgment against B. for slander. Justice
Gibson held the evidence inadmissible because the truth of the words was
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not in issue in the first slander suit. But he expressed the opinion that had
B. plead truth in the first action and failed to sustain his plea, this would
have been a decision that 13. said what was not true and, thezefore, a justification for calling him a har. It happened that the parties to both suits
were the same, so that the objection of a change of parties did not arise. He
distinctly said that had falsity been proved in this first suit It would have
been craclusirc evidence of the fact on the later suit. In this case at bar the
verdict of guilty in the criminal case was a distinct decision on the question
now raised on the plea of justification.
The question whether a defendant In the position of Corson here
should be allowed to escape is an interesting one of public policy. It has
been said that culprits should appear in their true colors lest honest men
be beguiled. On the other hand It is a clear moral wrong for one who
knows of a man's early delinquencies to come and blast a reputation earned
by long years of good behavior. To so pursue a man is to prevent his earning an honest livelihood and to drive him back into crime. Notwithstanding
this fact Mr. Odgers thinks we should stick to the old rule and suggests thai.
"Where a man is really malicious in making a statement he is almost sure
to go beyond the truth and say too much." The strictness with which a defendant is made to prove his plea is thus generally a sufficient protection.
Odgers on Libel and Slander *179.
But whether the rule is a good one or a bad one, It is certain that it is
the law unless we can find a statute that clearly abrogates it. The learned
court below refers us to the Act of April 11th, 1901, and strictly limits his
discussion of this phase of the case to a discussion of the statute. We infer
that be construcd the act as abrogating the common law on the subject. Is
The act of 1901 repealed by express reference the Act of
this correct'
July 1st, 1897, but we conceive that It left unaltered the common law rule
that the proof of the literal truth of a statement is an absolute defence r2gardless of all other maters.
In framing the Act of 1901 the tegislature evidently had before its mind
cases of publication of newspapers, journals or books. Otherwise the propriety of "public information and investigation" of the matter published
would be irrelevant. The common law rule demands the literal truth of the
defamation. Burford v. Wible, 32 Pa. 95, Shelly v. Dampman, 1 Super. Ct.
115. The Act of 1901 provides that under certain circumstances something
less, called "substantial truth" shall be a complete defence. This Is to widen
the occasions, when truth Is an available plea, not to narrow them. One
may now escape not only on proof of literal truth but also on proof
of substantial truth if the promulgation of It Is not malicious or negligent
and the mat.er Is proper for public information. The statute is affirmative
in form and purports to confer an Immunity from liability. We cannot see
how it can be construed to create a l:ability that did not before exist. If It
does so in any case It must be in that of newspapers, etc., and not In the
case of a private communication such as this. Had it been Intended to
make the defamer responsible despite thd truth of the defamation, it would
have been easy to say so, Instead of leaving such an Intention to a most
dubious Infnrence. The phraseology would probably have been, "In no civil
action foi- libel shall the plea of justification be received unless the matter
Is proper for public information and the statement has not been maliciously
or negligently made."
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Before the Act of 1901, while malice was always said to be part of the
tort of defamation, the malice was generally "legal malice," that is malice
which the courts declare to exist without direct proof on this point, whenever certain other facts were found to exist. In short, the malice was often
a fiction and not a fact. The 3d section of the Act of 1901 again illustrates
the Intention of the legislature to widen immunity. It enacts that no damages shall hereafter be recovered in any civil action for libel, unless it is
established "to the satisfaction of thc jury" that the publication was maliciously or negligently made. Hereafter a rerrehensible state of mind must be found
as a ract. "But," says the act, "where malice or negligence appears such
damages may lie awarded as the jury may deem proper." This is the exact
converso of the preceding statement and could well have been omitted for it
must have follewed as a necessary inference. It would be a violent twisting
of this sentence to say that it meant that whcrcver malice or negligence appears the jury must give damages. But this is the only construction under
which one could recover for a malicious recital of the truth. The truth has
always in itself conferred immunity. Now we conceivo there is a new
ground of immunity, namely, a blameless state of mind. It is absurd to Infer
that the creation of this new ground of immunity involves a destruction of
existing grounds of immuni-y
A similar quejtion of construction arose in Kansas. The state Constitution prov-dcs that "in all civil and criminal actions for libel the truth may
be given in evidence and if it shall appear that the alleged libellous matter
was published for justifiable ends the accused shall be acquitted." The Supreme Court of Kansas refused to infer that the accused must be convicted
whenever the matter was found to have een published for unjustifiable ends
regardless of its truth. It held either truth or the justifiable end to be a good
defence. Castle v. Houston, 19 Kas. 417.
Was the Corson letter "negligently" made? What it says Is true. It
was in tended that it should say what it does say. By negligently making a
publication must be meant, "negligently" conducting the investigation which
has led the publisher to believe what he alleges. If what Carson alleges Is
to be conceived as the verdict anl sentence, he was not negligent in making
the allegation, for they actually occurred. While a man may negligently
investigate, yet, if he discovers the Fact, his negligence would not be actionable. If we regard Corson's allegation as sfibstantially, that Barnett In
fact, stole, we do not see how a jury could find that he was negligent in coming to this conclusion. He had the judgment of the twelve jurors, formed on
sworn testimony, and sanctioned by the Court, in its acting upon th3 verdict.
Corson's motive in sending the letter was apparently, not to benefit the
bank or Barnett's fiancee, a motive wh'ch the jury might well find free from
malice, but to hurt Barnett. He knew Barnett, and had a grudge against him.
He was "animated" by this grudge, when he wrote the letter. His act was
"malicious" in the popular sense, which is also one of the legal senses. If we
regarded the third section of the Act of 1901 as applying to all cases, those
in which the defamatory assertions were true and these in which they
are untrue, it would follow that Corson should ray damages. We have rejected this view.
The publicity of proceedings in court Is for some reason, deemed desirdrawn from this, that the still wider publicaable, and a corollary has been
I
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tion of what is done in the court by means of newspapers, etc. Is permissible.
"The initial principle seems to be", says, Townshend, Slander and Libel,
352, "that the public good requires that the proceedings in courts of justice
should be conducted openly; * * * * A publication of the proceedings of a
court only extends that publicity which is so important a feature of the administration of the, law in England, and thus enables to be witnesses of It,
not merely the few whom the court can hold, but the thousands who can
read the report." "We ought" says Pollock Ch. B. "to make as wide as
possible the right of the public to know what takes place in a court of justice" Ryalls v. Lader, Law Rep; 1 Ec. 298.
1The publication of what goes on in court, is, therefore,
regarded as lending vision and audition of what transpires there, to those who are remote
from the court room. A publisher of what iS actually said, in court by witnesses, counsel, judge, jury, has impunity, unless it is shown that he publishes for some other object than merely to inform the public of what occurs
He may publish a judgment of disbarment of an attorin the court-house.
ney, McLaughlin v. M'Makin; Bright. N. T. 132; Pittock v. O'Niell, 63 Pa.
253; 11 P. & L. Dig. Decis. 18601..
Had Corson printed an account of the trial of Barnett in a newspaper, inthe course of his business as publisher he would not have been liable to
Barnett.
It does not oppear clearly why the courts have favored the publication of
judicial proceedings. Was it that the people might adjust their relations
and conduct towards the persons who appear In litigation, by the new knowledge they thus acquire, of their solvency, their honesty and integrity, their
chastity, their disposition to use violence, etc? Is it supposed that every
man fias a right to know whether X is a thief, or Y an adulterer, or Z a
fraudulent debtor?
It would be difficult to justify a distinction between publication of court
proceedings within the judicial district, and publication beyond, within the
state and beyond. It would be equally difficult to support a distinction between reports made shortly after the transactions in court and those made a
week, a month, a year afterwards. Nor less easy is the effort to vindicate
the toleration of the ordinry newspaper publication, which may be read' by
five hundred or five thousand persons while refusing it to an account written
in a letter for the perusal of two or three persons only. If the people-iu
general of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, might properly be informed of
the conviction of Barnett of larceni, it is hard to see why his bank president and his fiancee might not be informed of it. Since, however, the publication of court proceedings are in no case more than prima facie privileged
and since we have actual malice found here as a fact, the 'defendant could
not hve hoped to escape liability on this ground.
The damage in the case is so clear and abundant that It Is hard to conceive how the want of this element could be urged as a defence. The discussion by the learned court below of the distinction between those words
actionable per se and those requiring proof of damage was, therefore, quite
irrelevant and gratuitous. Had no damage been shown, it would then have
been important to prove the words actionable per se, as they doubtless were.
The lower court erred in failing to give binding Instructions for the defendant and the judgment must be ireversed.
judgment reversed.
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EVANS vs. SOMLEY.

Contract For Sale of Real Property-Fee Simple-Sale Of Wife'5- Land On
Judgment Against Husband-Marketable

Title.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
William Adams conveyel a farm to Mrs. Matilda Jenks, subsequently on
a judgment against her husband, John Jenks, the farm was sold to Elias
Evans. He has contracted to convey it in fee to' Samuel Somley, who refuses to receive the deed and pay the purchase money, $4,000.00, because the
title is not marketable.
Showalter for the plaintiff.
If the judgment was a result of the expenditure of money for repairs
and improvements to wife's separate estate, made at her request and necessary for its preservation and enjoyment, the wife is liable. Lippincott
vs. Hopkins, 57 Pa. 328; Lippincott vs. Seeds, 77 Pa. 420; Germania Savings
Eank's Appeal, 95 Pa. 329.
Braddock for the defendant.
Real estate of married women not subject to levy and execution for the
debts and liabilities of husbands. Act of 1848 and 1850; Real Estate Co. vs.
Rupp, 132 Pa. 496. Defendants could not have specific performance. Hoffman vs. Bradshaw, 17 Superior 205.
Irregular judgment can be opened any time within seven years,Mathus
vs. Patterson, 33 Pa. 487; Klinger vs. Koons, 13 Pa. Co. Ct. 641.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
DAVIES, J:-This Is an action in assumpsit to recover the purchase money on a contract to convey a fee simple title to the property In dispute. The
defense is, that Elias Evans, the plaintiff in this action, cannot convey a
marketable title. That a party to a contract to convey a fee cannot be compelled to accept a title that Is not marketable, is a prinicple of law so firmly
established that citations in support of it are unnecessary. Therefore, The
question to be decided Is, whether or not the plaintiff is the owner of a mar
ketable title.
",k marketable title Is one In which there Is no doubt involved either as
to matter of law or fact. Every title Is doubtful which invites or exposes the
party holding it to litigation. If there be a color of title, outstanding, which
may prove substantial, though there is not enough evidence to enable the
chancellor to say so, a purchaser will not be compelled to take it and encounPa. 424.
ter the hazard of litigation. Herman vs. Sellers, 158
The act of 1848 provides. That all such property of whatever kind.
which shall accrue to a married woman during coverture, by will, descent.
deed of conveyance or otherwise shall be owned, used and enjoyed by such
married woman as her separate estate, and the said property whether owned
by her before marriage, or which shall accrue to her afterwards, shall not be
liable to levy or execution for the debts or liabilities of her husband."
The plaintiff's title is derived from a sale on a judgment against John
Jenks, the husband of Matilda Jenks. The owner of the premises in dispute.
She, Matilda Jenks, is the grantee ;n the deed from William Adams, and In
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the absence of evidence to the contrary she is presumed to be the absolute
owne: of the premises.
Under the provisfons of the Act of 1850, the interest of the husband as
tenant by the courtesy is exempt fromn levy and sale for any debt against the
husband during the life of the wife.
If the debtor, John Jenks. had no Interest in the property sold, and no
such interest appears on the record, no title passed to the purchaser, Elia-.
Evans. And having no title he could convey none.
But admitting that the burden 1s upon the wife to prove sufficiently that
the purchase money was not furnished by the husband, there is, at least, a
color of outstanding title which nay prove substantial. This is sufficient to
render the title unmarketable.
Evey title is doubtful which Invites or exposes the party holding it to
litigation.We think it will be conceded that under the circumstances of thia
case, that the title of Evans exposes him to litigation at the instance of Matilda Jenks, or those in privity with hpr. There is no evidence of the quality
of her proof, but this is unnecessary to a decision of this case, as a color of
outstanding title which may prove substantial, renders the title unmarketable.
We are clearly of opinion that the title of Evans is unmarketable, and
therefore, he cannot recover the purchase money In this action.
Verdict. judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
The farm was conveyed to Mrs Matilda Jenks. She has not conveyed
her estate In it to Elias Evans. He has acquired simply whatever interest
if any, John Jenks, her husband had. He has contracted to convey the Ian:
in fee to Samuel Somley for $4000, and Somley cannot be compelled to accept
the conveyance and to pay the price, unless he shall get both a good title, and
a marketable title.
It does not appear that the farm was purchased for Mrs. Jenks by her
husband. If it was, there would be no presumption of a resulting trust. He
could not, as against her, claim the land.
His creditors might do what he could not do. They might maintain that,
as against them, he must be deemed the owner. But, they could do this only
on the condition that their debts existed when the purchase of the farm was
made or that that purchase was made in anticipation of these debts and for
the purpose of evading them. It doesnot appear that there were such debts.
The debt on which the execution sale tcok place, may not have come into
existence for years after the conveyance to Mrs. Jenks. The facts do not appear which would constitute a good title in Evans.
Had it appeared that the debt existed when the conveyance to Mrs. Jenks
was made, it would have been incumbent upon her, in a contest with Evans,
to show that she had funds of her own, with which, without financial aid
from her husband, she bought the land. Prima facie, the title of Evans would
then have been "good," but it would not have been "marketable." Every titl3
is good or not good, but the facts which determine them to be of the one or
the other class; may be as yet undi3covered, when the court is requested to
grant specIfic performance. The court would not refrain from decreeing performance because of the mere poss;bility of the existence of facts which
would vitiate the title, but when something Is proved that makes reasonable

THE

FORUM

67

a serious doubt as to the goodness of it, the chancellor will remit the plaintiff
to his action at law. Cf. Fry, Specific Performance, pp. 405, 408.
The facts disclosed here show a title in Mrs. Jenks and none in Jenks.
in a contest between Somley and the former, the burden would be upon him
to prove facts which, so far as we know, do not exist, and are therefore un.
-provable or which, if they do exist, he may not be In a position to prove. He
clearly buys a law-suit, and not improbably, a losing law-suit. Under such
circumstances, it would be inequitaole to compel him to pay the price he
agreed to pay for a good and marketable title, and, if he contracted to get
such a title, it would be inequitablc to make a new contract for him by obliging him to accept a less valuable one, even at a reduced price. It Is for him,
not the chancellor, to say what he ahall buy, and when it is once determined
that what he bought he is not getting. it follows that he is not under a duty
on account of his contract, to take anything else.
Appeal dismissed.

HARPER vs. R. R. CO.

Covenant To Maintain Fences Along Railroad Tracks-Negligence-Contlnu.
Ing Liability-Trespass.

The company obtained the right of way from Harper through his farm by
a covenant in writing to make and xeep good repair of fences both sides of
track. They built the fence but one night some one broke two panels. They
remained down five days. On the second plaintiff's two horses got from his
field ihrough the breach upon the track and were killed. He brings trespass
for the loss. A wcod skirted the fences so as to preven- his observing the
breach when he turned the horses into the field.
Sorber for the plaintiff.
Smith for the defendant.
Action should have been assumpsit. Morse vs. Clem, 4 Pa. Co. Ct. 118.
Railroad allowed a reasonable time to make repairs and liable for only ordinary care to keep fences in repair. King vs. C. R. & P. Ry. Co. 90 Mo. 520;
Lemmos vs. R. R. Co., 32 Iowa 151.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
THOMPSON, J:-At common law the owner Df a close was not supposed
to fence against cattle of the occupant of an adjolning close for the obJect and design of fencing is not to keep the cattle of others off the premises
but to keep the cattle of the occupant at home. See 25 Vt. 116. And in the
absence of statute or covenant the owners of land adjoining a railroad are required to keep their cattle off their neighbor's farm; and if they fail to do so
they must suffer in action for damages. But if there is a statute or covenant
requiring the railroad company to make end maintain fences in good repal
on both sides of the road and cattle of the adjacent land owner are injured
through the negligence of the company to make and maintain a fence, the
corporation are chargeable with the risk and are subject to the damages as
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are inflicted and sustained thereby. News Eng. Case Law Digest, vol. 9, 937.
Sharrod vs. L. & N. W. Ry. 25 Vt. 116; Dunkirk and A. V. R. R. Co. vs.
Mead, 90 Pa. 454; Curtin vs. R. R. Co., 135 Pa., 20; Silver vs. R. R. Co.; 79
Mo., 528; Glandon vs. Ry. Co., 68 Iowa, 457; Wood on Railroads, vol. 3, pp.
1867, speaking of fencing, says "In the different states the statutes are quite
diverse in their provisions. In some of them the company is made liable it
it fails to build or maintain a fence irrespective of the question of negligence
on the part of either party; while in others liability depends entirely upon
the question of negligence.
In looking over the Pennsylvania cases, we find that Drake vs. P. & E. R.
R.Co., 51 Pa. 240 touches upon the point but does not decide it. Reitzl vs.
Ry. Co., 126 Pa., 437 holds that if che defendant company were bound to keep
the plaintiff's fences in repair, the defendant could not sit by and permit his
property to stray on the railroad's property and sue for their value from time
to time as they were killed. But in the case at bar the plaintiff was not
aware of the breach in the fence as the clump of trees was in the way.
Under the head of "eminent domain" Wood, on page 1052-3, vol. 2, says,
"Where the company is by law requircd to build and maintain a fence, neither
the expense of building them or maintaining them should be considered nor
the fact that the company has neglected to build or maintain them, as the
land owner has an adequate remedy for the breach of duty on the part ot
the company. This would lead us to think that when a right of way is acquired that the purchase price does net include a provision for future damages. According to Hornback vs. C. & Z. R. R. Co., 20 Ohio, 81, an agreement to make and maintain a fence is an inter proprietary regulation; at
continuing contract between adjoining proprietors.
So then the case resolves itself to this. Did the railroad company by
agreeing to make and maintain a fenec really, in substance, agree to keep
the cattle within the owner's 'fieid. W3 think they did, and so n~ust render
judgment for plairtiff.
OPINION

OF SUPREME

COURT.

A part of the price of the right of v.ay was the making of fences on
both sides of the track and the keeping of them in good repair. It was
a matter of importance to Harper, who, in order to preserve his horses
and cattle from injury, would otherwise, have been compelled to build
and maintain them himself.
The Company built the fences and doubtless, intended to keep them
in repair. Two of the panels, were one night broken by some one.
They wera not repaired for five days. A storm, the purposed or accidental act of a human being or ihal o cattle or horses, might at any
time prostrate a part of the fence, and doubtless the company would commit no breach of the contract if within a proper time, it made trepalrs
The safety of the property of the plaintiff and not less that of passengers on the trains, was of sucha Importance as to require very considerable vigilance for the detection of breaches of the fence, and diligence
in its restoration. It was entirely proper for the jury to find, possibly the
court should have instructed it, that the non-discovery and non-repair of
the opening in the fence for five days would be an unpardonable violation of the defendant's duty.
The two horses of the plaintiff got on the track and were killed upon
the second day after the panels were blown down. The jury have been
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allowed to find that the delay of between 24 and 48 hours was a violation of duty. Considering the seriousness of its probable result, we
take the same view. The trains of ihe Company were passing daily. The
officers on them should have been instructed to keep a look-out for a
broken fence as much as for objects upon the tracks.
A wood skirted the fences, so as to prevent Harper from detecting the
defects of the fence. It was not his special duty, as it was the Company's to inspect the fence and repair it. The contract was designed,
ir. part, to relieve him of this necessity. Nothing appearing would warrant a finding by the jury that his failure to discover the opening and
to repair it was the result of his negligence.
The action is trespass. Although the duty to repair the fence was
created by the contract, the violation of it is a tort. The action of
Ii espass on the case would have been a;, appropriate remedy.
Trespass
now does what the action of case formerly did. 2 Brightly, Practice, 43;
Pittsburg vs. Crier, 22 Pa. 54 Cf. Scowden vs. Erie PR R. Co., 26 Super, 15.
Judgment affirmed.

JOHN ADAMS VS.

R. R. CO.

Trespass-Negligence-Stop, Look and Listen-Failure to Blow Whistle
-Reliance

on Schedule.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Adams. in driving across the tracks wrs seriously hurt by collision
with a locomotive. The trains were run with great regularity, as Adams
knew, and no train was due by the schedule for 15 minutes. At the point
where he was crossing he could have easily heard the whistle of the
locomotive. He listened for it but did not hear it, though it was the
uniform custom of engines approaching it, to whistle. The evening was
cloudy and somewhat dark, and Adams, though he stopped and looked,
did not see the train. He would not have ventured over the tracks,
however, but for the failure to hear the whistle, and for his reliance on
the lain schedule. He sues for damages.
Robertson for the Plaintiff.
Presumption is that every man does his duty until the contrary is proven; Schum vs. Pa. P. R. Co., 107 Pa. 8; Longnecker vs. Penna. R. R. Co.,
105 Pa. 328.
Traveler not bound to alight and go upon the tracks before crossing when
he can get a view of the tracks without alighting. Ellis vs. R. R. Co., 139
Pa. 506; Ccntral H. R. Co. of N. J. vs. Feller, 84 Pa. 226.
Plaintiff took more than ordinary pr2cautions. Myers vs. B. & 0. R. H.
Co., 150 Pa. 387; Haverstick vs. R. H. Co., 171 Pa. 101.
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Tcbin for the Defendant.
One struck by a moving train which was plainly visible from the point
be occupied, when it became his duty to stop, look and listen, must be conclusively presumed to have disregarded that rule of law and to have gone
negligently into an obvious danger. Meyers vs. R. R. Co., 150 Pa. 386;
Gray vs. Pa. R. R. Co., 172 Pa., 383; Ely vs. Ry. Co., 158 Pa. 233.
Stopping, looking and listening must not be merely nominal but substantial and careful. 12 Am. Neg. Cases. 569.
Railroad has the right to run trains at all times. Am. & Eng. Ency.,
Vcl. 4, pp. 913.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
LEWIS J.:-This Is an actlol by Adams who was injured by a locomotiveof the defendant company while crossing its tracks. The first ques.
tion to be considered is. what are the duties of one crossing the tracks?
and did this person claiming damages exercise the necessary precautions
We think he did. He had familiarized himself with the schedule, a duty
which Is not regularly imposed upon travelers, and yet he took the precaution to stop, look and listen.
In 138 Pa. 506, the court held "It Is not incumbent upon a traveler
about to cross a railroad track at. a public crossing, to alight from his
vehicle and go uron the tracks before attempting to cross, when he can
get a view of the crossing without alighting." We agree with this decision. It is preposterous to suppose a man is obliged to climb from his
wagon and look up and down the tracks, before he can venture across
It is sufficient if he stop, look and listen. This the plaintiff did. He
knew no train was due at that hour and yet he stopped, looked and
listened and hearing no whistle, started again. He had done all that
was required.
In the case of Gray vs. Pcnna. R. R. Co., 172 Pa. 383, Mr. Justice
Dean held that "the traveler about to cross a railroad track must stop, look
and listen but that such stopping, looking and listening must not
be merely nominal or perfunctory but substantial, careful and adapted
to accomplish the end in view." We think in this case the plaintiff had
taken these- precautions. Knowing as he did that no train was due iU
seems to us that he was 4xtemely careful In taking the further care
to stop, look and wait for the signal of approach.
From the facts two points appear which lead to the conclusion that the
engineer of the train was the negligent person-not the traveler. It appearE
the night was dark and cloudy-a fact which tends to the Inference that If
the Plaintiff had a fair view of the tracks he could not have missed seeing
the headlight of the engine. But because he did -not see It we may infer
that his view was obstructed-this does not appear in the facts-and be.
cause of such obstruction the engineer wes put to a greater or more oppres
sive duty of blowing the whistle. This he could not have done.-If he had
the plaintiff would certainly have heard it, being as the facts state, In sucb
a place that had it blown he could not have failed to hear It. From the fail.
ure of the engineer to blow his whistle we must hold that the company was
negligent and give damages for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
That the locomotive of the defendant did not whistle, as it approached
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the crossing, the jury might Infer from the failure of the plaintiff to hear
it, although he listened for it. The jury might properly find this omission
to be negligence. It was the uniform custom of the engines, to whistle.
This is some evidence that the servants of the company, in the exercise of
their functions, had thought that care required whistling.
That this custom was known to the plaintiff could have been inferred
from the evidence before the jury, for he "listened for it.' When the comrany has uniformly employed a signal, and thus superinduced an expectation that it will continue to employ it, the non-employment of it on a given
occasion, tends to mislead persons who have known of its usage, and this of
itself, may be an act of negligence. Lake Shore Railway vs. Frantz, 127 Pa
297.
It is not necessary to decide here that a traveler has a right to expect
on the particular occasion, the doing by the train of what all previous traina
have done, and under the influence of this expectation, to omit adopting precautions which but for it, he would be obliged to adopt, for it does not ap.
pear that the plaintiff failed to do any thing that he ought to have done,
even had there been no habit of the dfendant to whistle. He stopped be.
fore crossing, he looked for any app,.caching train. He saw none. He saw
none probably because of the cloudIness and darkness of the evening. Wra
cannot say that the fact that he was run into proved that he did not lool%
and that the jury should not have been permitted to find that he did, when
the non-discovery of the train is axplcable consistently with his having
used his senses.
T.he plaintiff said that he would not have ventured over the tracks, but
for the failure to hear t he whistle, and for his reliance on the train schedule.
But he also says that he stopped and looked. Of course, had he heard the
whistle, though he did not see the trtin, it would have been negl1 gence in him to attempt to cross. He could not properly act on the
information fvrnished by the sense of sight, when that of hearing was ap.rizing him o" danger; but when neither sense was giving him warning of
danger, he surely had the right to attempt to cross.
The trains were as Adams knew, run with great regularity, and none
was flue at this place for fifteen minutes. He says that he relied on th?
train schedule. Had he done so exclusively of other modes of information.
it would have been negligence per se. However regularly the trains run,
there is always the possibility that a particular train will for some reason
be tardy, or even ahead of time. The duty of stopping, looking and listening, is not so onerous that a person should be allowed to substitute for it
some other source of inference as to the approach of a train. But, although
Adams would not have ventured over the track, but for his reliance on thi
observance of the schedule, he did not In fact venture upon it until he had
stopped, lcoked, and listened. Had the schedule told him that a train wa.I
due, ft might have been negligened in him to attempt to cross notwithstandIng that his senses revealed no train. It could not be negligence, when both
senses and schedule concurred in telling him that no train was at hand.
Judgment affirmed.
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HEIKES vs. R. R.

Railroad.Crossings-Duty to Stop, Look and Listen.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
At a certain crossing the railroad had a safety gate and a watchman.
When trains were coming it was the duty of the watchman, to close the
gates and to signal to the passengers, afoot or in vehicles not to attempt to
cross. On a certain day, Heikes was approaching the track, intending t3
cross it. He saw the gate open, ar.d the watchman gave no signal to him.
Inferring that no train was coming he advanced on the tracks and was run
into by a train. Had he stopped, and looked, he could not have seen the
train on account of a train standing on the next track. Had he listened he
would probably have heard the noise of the approaching train.
Roush for the plaintiff.
The rule that one about to cross a railroad track must stop, look and
listen does not apply in all cases.
Conway vs. Phila. W. & B. R. R.
17 Phila. 71. Roberts vs. Delaware &- Hudson Canal Co., 177 Pa. 183.
Duffy for the defendant.
The duty of stopping is more maiifest when an approaching train cannot be seen, than when it can. Beale vs. Penna. R. R. Co., 73 Pa. 504. Hanover R. R. Co. vs. Coyle, 55 Pa. 396. North Penna. R. R. Co. vs. Heileman
49 Pa. 60.
Failure to stop, look and listen at railroad crossing is
negligence
per se. Thrig vs. Erie R. R. Co., 210 Pa. 98.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
LINDLEY, J:-While in other 6tates it is generally for the jury to determine from the facts whether the plaintiff should have stopped as well as
have looked and listened, in Pennsylvania it is an imperative rule that he
should stop, look, and listen before crossing a railroad track. If he fail tc
observe this rule of law he is guilty of contributary negligence;
and furthermore, his duty in this respect is not modified or conditioned by the presence of safety gates or ozher devices for the protection of the public.
The duty is absolute and unbending, but it is founded upon reason and
has been evolved not only for the protection of travelers on the highway
but also for that of the train and its occupants, and no amount of negligencti
on the part of the defendant can absolve the plaintiff from his obligation.
The fact that the safety gates were up did not and could not relieve the
plaintiff from the necessity of observing the imperative rule of law for all
railroad crossings. Lake Shore R. R. Co. vs. Frantz, 127 Pa. 307; Greenwood vs. R. R. Co. 124 Pa. 572.
In the case at bar, the facts show that the safety gate was open and that
the watchman gave no signal to the plaintiff to warn him of the impending
danger. This was gross negligence on the part of the servant of the defend.
ant Company. But the fact that the watchman wr.s derelict, In no sense excused the plaintiff from his plain duty of stopping, looking and listening.
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This is particularly true as the facts further state that he could not have
seen the approaching train on account of a train standing on the next track
"He probably would have heard the noise of the approaching train."
The duty of stopping is more manifest when an approaching train cao
not be seen or heard than when it can. The fact of collision shows the neccesslty there was of stopping, and therefore in every case of collision the
rule must be an unbending one. There never was a more important principle settled than that the fact of the failure to stop immediately before
crossing a railroad track is not merely evidence of negligence for the jury,
but negligence per se and a question for the court.
Penna R. R. Co. vs. Beale, 73 Pa. 504.
vs. Ritchie et al., 102 Pa. 425.

Reading & Columbia R. R. Co.

Justice Mitchell in a very recent case, King vs. Erie R. R. Co., 210 Pa. 99
says: "The rule that a person must stop, look and listen before going upon
the tracks of a railioad, is not a rule of evidence but a rule of law, peremptory, absolute, and uubending, and in this there is"no break nor wavering, In
the line of cases cxtending back nearly forty yearz, which holds that the rule
is inflexible and admits no exceptions and that failure to observe it is no!
m.rcly evidence of negligence but negligence per se."
The plaintiff in the case at bar was Indisputably guilty of negligence
per se according to our Pennsylvania law, and therefore has no foundatioa
on which to base his claim for damages.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Heikes did not stop and lcok. But if he had stopped and looked, he
could not have seen the train approaching. The looking therefore would
have given him no information that would have, or ought to have, deterred
him from crossing the track. Though the omission to look was negligent,
the negligence did not contribute to the accident. It would therefore nor,
prevent a recovery.
But, Heikes did not listen, and had he done so, he "would probably have
heard the noise of the approaching train." He would then, have avoided
the accident. Was his omission to listen consistent with care?
The cases cited by the learned court below show that the omission to
listen is not merely evidence of negligence but negligence per se, unles-i
there are extraordinary circumstances which may excuse it. The only circumstances suggested as ameans !or excusing it here, are the maintenance
by the defendant of a safety gate and a watchman, and the failure of the
latter to close the gate or to signal to Heikes that a train was coming
That these facts tended to lure Heikes to the attempt to cross there Is no
doubt. Railway v. Frantz, 127 Pa. 297. He had no right to rely upon them.
He should have had in mind the possibility of the watchman's neglect; or
sudden disablement, or the sudden unworkableness of the gate. It is negligent to so far assume the care of the watchman, as to omit the use of one s
own senses, for the detection of a.a approaching train. Care will be presumed, at the trial of a case, untill It is disproved, but the possible consequences of the crossing of a railroad are too serious to justify the undertak-
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Lake Shore etc.
lng of it, in dependence merely upon tbls presumption.
Railway v. Frantz, 127 Pa. 297; Greenwood v. Railroad Co., 124 Pa. 572.
Judgment affirmed.
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Pepper and Lewis' Digest of Statutes.
The profession is glad to learn that a new edition of this indispensable
work will appear within a -comparatively short time. The first edition contained no statutes later than those of the sessions of 1893; but the new one
will incorporate the law of all the sessions, including that of 1905. The one
grave defect of the first edition was the Index. Special emphasis is being put
on the Jndex of the new edition. This will enhance tenfold the ease of handling ths book. The well known features that made it so much more convenient than any rival, large type, pages of double columns, notes closely appended to the text, comprehensive annotations, will be preserved. The appearance of the book will be greeted with sincere pleasure.

